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THE NECESSITY AND WISDOM OF REASONABLE PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR BY THE UNITED STATES

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The wording of the title of this paper appears to exclude consideration of any preparation for the event of war. It is not assumed that war is inevitable, but rather that war is possible, if not probable, to the people of the United States. If it is assumed that war is a remote instead of a near possibility the kind and degree of preparedness will be appreciably affected. Likewise if it is considered only a possibility and not a probability, judging by the birth of our nation and its succeeding history to date, we may look upon war as a probability for the United States. Our strenuous and at present successful efforts to maintain neutrality, under the conditions of the present "world war," does not alter the probability of war for the United States, even though we succeed in refraining from entering the present international struggle for existence and supremacy. Are we ready for probable war? As a member of the family of nations the United States must assume all obligations devolving upon it in such a relationship. One of these obligations involves preparation for war. What are the necessities for preparation? To present them all with clear and accurate dress would require a rehearsal of the studies and conclusions of the War College Division of the General Staff of the Army. The limits of this paper do not permit of the presentation of the technical details of the subject. All of these details, including the plans for the complete accomplishment of every project, with estimated cost, are available in the War Department and are or may be known to the proper committees of Congress. In general we may briefly summarize our necessities for preparation as follows:

1. The defense of our enormous seacoast lines.
2. The special defense of harbors.
3. The proper organization of the land forces for offensive and defensive operations.
4. The strategical defense of outlying possessions.
5. The coöperation of land and naval forces for offensive and defensive operations.
6. The special defense of the Panama Canal.
7. The special defense of the seat of government in the Philippine Islands.
8. The defense of our northern and southern land boundaries.
9. The preservation of neutrality in time of war.
10. The organization and training of the regular army under modern conditions, 300,000 men.
11. The organization and training of the reserve land forces under modern conditions, 700,000 men.
12. The organization and practical operation of transportation facilities on land and sea.
13. The preparation and storage for convenient distribution of reserve quartermaster supplies.
14. The preparation and storage for convenient distribution of reserve ordnance supplies.
15. The construction and storage for ready distribution of reserve equipment and munitions for field artillery.
16. The construction and storage for ready distribution of reserve equipment and munitions for seacoast fortifications and for the defense of harbors.
17. The organization and training of aviation squadrons, with the preparation and storage of reserve equipment.
18. The construction and maintenance of strategical railways, roadways and waterways.
19. The organization and supervision of lines of communication in connection with bases of supplies and the coöperative control of telegraph, telephone and wireless systems.
20. The organization and control of hospital accommodations and sanitary service for a million of men, with

the preparation and storage of reserve supplies for ready distribution and instant use.

The wisdom of reasonable preparation for war must be evident from what precedes. The selection and training of the personnel, the manufacture and storage of supplies and equipments, and the vast preparation and maintenance for offensive and defensive operations in the protection of a nation of one hundred millions of people can hardly be accomplished over night by a message from the dove of peace. To properly conceive and devise for this great work is the function of our military experts of the General Staff, specially trained for such a purpose.

Should a million untrained men, in a burst of enthusiastic patriotism, offer themselves, within twenty-four hours, to the government for national defense such loyalty and unanimity would not make a workable military unit of the whole or any portion of them. In the first place there would be a large elimination through physical and mental defects, and other losses would follow a strict regimen in gaining military efficiency and readiness. Willingness and enthusiasm does not constitute efficiency in any profession and manifestly not in the accomplishment of the complex duties of the military profession. There is nothing short of honest, efficient and immediate preparation for defense, except where the state courts disaster or suffers it through neglect.

That means making ready to uphold and maintain the sovereignty of a national unit, or an aggregation of people calling themselves a nation, as the result of submission to the will of a central power authorized to govern them. Who grants this authority to govern, this power to control the destinies of great groups of people? The answer is, the people themselves. From the dawn of human kind to the present time the races of man have gathered into governing units. The members thereof of all degrees of intelligence have recognized the advantages of a community of interest, of companionship, of the strength and security of organization, of the economy of combined effort, of the efficiency of systematized labor, of the value of discipline

and training, and of keeping all of these forces in active operation to prevent atrophy and the disintegration of the union. In union there is strength only so long as all of the parts thereof are maintained at the highest state of efficiency. This is the acknowledgment of a fundamental principle in the affairs of mankind, evolved from ages of human experience. The progress of evolution in the making of the American nation has not advanced to the point where this truth is fully realized. It is the basis for preparation for eventualities, not only among individuals, but with those aggregations of individuals called nations.

Individuals and nations can never outgrow the application of these fundamental truths because they will always remain in the process of development. There is no promise of a perfect state on this mundane sphere. All history and investigation fails to disclose the panacea for all ills, or the fountain of eternal bliss and undisturbed peace. All promises of that nature are delusions. The biblical saying of "wars and rumors of wars" as applied to an earthly existence coincides with the experience of all mankind from the beginning of time. It figuratively and truthfully expresses the conflicts of all kinds and degrees on our planet in preparation for another life in futurity. We are continually warned to fight sin and the devil, with every means at our command, even to the employment of fire and the sword. We do not hesitate to defend and sustain our missionaries by the use of police, constabulary or troops, and for what? To force upon other people a doctrinal faith which they do not believe and do not want. Our justification is that in the opinion of a minority, under the influence of specially created conditions, the specified faith is a good thing for all and should be embraced and contended for by all.

We spend millions of money and sacrifice thousands of lives in preparation for and in defense of the tenets of a religious faith. We fight today as the world has always done for the maintenance of that faith. Why not prepare and fight for something equally tangible and directly affecting the daily life of all classes of people, viz: the sovereignty

of a people, the national entity and the bill of rights we have sworn to defend? The Indian and foreign wars in the early history of the United States demonstrated the fact that a confederacy was too weak a basis on which to build the superstructure of a strong and independent nation. There must be a closer union of the colonies and some of their rights must be surrendered to a central power possessed of superior and exclusive authority to prepare and maintain military forces adequate to protect the embryo nation by resort to the implements of war. Protection under the civil law has required centuries of preparation and the system becomes more complex and difficult of application with each succeeding year of growth because of the manifold relations of men, continually multiplied by the amazing progress in science and art. The inalienable rights of mankind vouchsafed and fostered by the civil law are incapable of being fully maintained and secured by the operation of that law alone. Sacred or secular history fails to furnish an example to sustain the opposite contention. When the last phase of the critical situation arises the deciding factor is resort to force of arms. World peace is yet a fantasy and will remain so as long as the varied races of mankind exist. The human mind has never conceived of a solution for the problem of unifying the races and rendering them content to submit to the control of any one system, civil, religious or military. No common language has ever been devised to supplant the babel of tongues, no common law to destroy caste, no common religion to satisfy the cravings of the souls of men, no common code of living to unite the white and colored races, and no practical idealism to level the differences of birth, habits and training. The oceans no longer protect the United States through isolation for both the air and the water have been brought under subjection for commercial and for military purposes. Our forefathers braved the sea and the rigorous climate of the north to lay the foundations of this Republic. They were slow to sever relations with the mother country and slower still to prepare for adequate defense. It is well known how

great were the labors and sacrifices of him whom we love to call the "Father of our Country." He learned the difficulties of defense through the bitter disappointment of unpreparedness by contending therewith as a military commander in the field. Had Washington devoted himself exclusively to civil and commercial pursuits his views as to the military needs of the country might have been those of his opponents. But the demands of his country combined with his peculiar qualifications for leadership and command threw him into the fray for the moulding of republican institutions. When he assumed great military responsibilities he quickly realized their intimate relation to national destiny and the preservation of the rights of the people under a stronger union than the colonies or the states could give individually, or through the loose control of a confederacy. It invariably results that when our civilian Secretaries of the Army and Navy Departments get warmed up to their work their views on military and naval problems undergo a radical change, illustrating the fact that experience, under the impetus of an impressive oath of office, and the atmosphere of new and absorbing responsibilities, changes the view point and convictions of the men who occupy high public positions. As a man's horizon broadens and his vision clears up with added responsibilities of greater positions of trust his mentality expands and the shadows of coming events are more easily interpreted. If liberally educated and of tolerant views he will rise to meet each new situation with confidence and power. Such men will be able to adjust our military resources to the recognized needs of the nation. It was in his farewell address at the close of his public career that Washington, after having reached a sound judgment upon the military needs of the nation said with great impressiveness,

There is rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.

How very significant the expression: "it must be *known* that we are at *all times ready for war*." That means that *all nations* must *know* that the United States of America is at all times ready for the eventualities of war. These weighty words were uttered by Washington to the American people more than 100 years ago. With what result? That all nations do know that the United States is *not* prepared for war and *never has* been prepared for such a catastrophe. They do know that it was born as a nation in the midst of war; that it has maintained its cohesion and unity as a nation through the agency of war; that it has expanded its borders through resort to war; that it has gathered a brood of distant islands (colonies) through the results of war; and that all of these wars have been unnecessarily prolonged and costly because of lack of preparation for their occurrence. Our sister nations also know that in spite of our war-like history we are an extremely vulnerable nation as to both defense and offense; that a large and influential mass of the American people are lulled into security by the ideals and delusions of pacifism; that the public mind is weakened as to national responsibilities by the academic discussion of the unrighteousness of war; that the doctrine of preparedness for war is purposely and cheerfully misinterpreted to mean the encouragement of war and the establishment of the duellist standard of honor. Thus have we considered and acted upon the advice of the "Father of our Country." On September 24, 1776, at the beginning of the Revolution Washington appealed to Congress on the subject of military preparation as follows:

When the Army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the men might have been got without a bounty for the war. After this, they began to see that the contest was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence by remarking that, to get in their militia in the course of the last year many towns were induced to give them a bounty. For seeing the evils resulting from this and the destructive consequences which unavoidably would follow short enlistments, I took the liberty, in a long letter, to recommend the enlistments *for and during the war*, assigning such reasons for it, as experience has since convinced me were well founded. Certain I am that

it would be cheaper to keep fifty or hundred thousand in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in pay, before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which, in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress, they must be furnished with, or sent home, added to other incidental expenses, consequent upon coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will, in my opinion, prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause.

If these things were true of the American army 140 years ago they are still true today but with much more emphasis.

Again Washington warns Congress by these significant words:

I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops, as would be competent for almost every exigency, far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which when effected are not attended with any good consequences.

Our renowned and indefatigable General Grant proffered the following advice to the American people, as the result of his intense and unselfish career in military and civil functions:

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict such as the last one, occurring among our own people again. But growing as we are in population, wealth and military power, we may become the *envy* of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago. And unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out.

General Upton in his *Military Policy of the United States* (1880) shows how persistently, recklessly and expensively our country has failed to establish an efficient military policy and concludes with these words:

Unless we frame and bequeath to the succeeding generations a military system suggested by our past experience and com-

mended by the example of other enlightened nations, our rulers and legislators in the next war will fall into the same errors and involve the country in the same sacrifices as in the past.

This prediction was fully verified in the Spanish-American War and to a somewhat lesser degree in the Philippine insurrection. The following words from General Upton again bear impressively upon this subject:

Our military policy, or as many would affirm our want of it, has now been tested during more than a century. It has been tried in foreign, domestic and Indian wars, and while military men, from painful experience, are united as to its defects and dangers, our final success in each conflict has so blinded the popular mind, as to induce the belief that as a nation we are invincible.

With the greater mass of people, who have neither the time nor the inclination to study the requirements of military science, no error is more common than to mistake military resources for military strength, and particularly is this the case with ourselves.

As history records our triumph in the wars of our country and as nearly all of these wars were largely begun by militia and volunteers, the conviction has been produced that with us a regular army is not a necessity. In relating the events of these wars, the historian has generally limited himself to describing the battles that have been fought, without seeking to investigate the delays and disasters by which they have been prolonged, till, in nearly every instance, the national resources have been exhausted.

Military resources are one thing and military strength another. For military resistance, the strength of a government is the power it can wield on the field of battle. In the war of 1812 the strength of the government was measured by 6000 militia. At the battle of Bull Run it was measured by 35,000 of the same kind of troops. In one case the capital fell into the hands of the enemy, while in the other our existence as a nation possibly depended upon the irresolution and supineness of a band of insurgents. At Gettysburg the wave of rebellion was resisted by 80,000 veteran troops. Had we trusted to the same number of militia the capital would have been captured and the government hopelessly destroyed. Unable to suppress in two years an insurrection which culminated in a great rebellion, the representatives of the people were forced to adopt conscription and to concentrate in the hands of the President all the war powers granted by the Constitution, whereupon weakness gave place to strength, but at the expense of a needless sacrifice of life and property.

At the laying of the corner-stone of the Army War College Building in Washington on February 21, 1903, the

Secretary of War, Elihu Root, paid high tribute to General Upton as one who originated many well-devised plans for the improvement and highest development of the American army. The Secretary said that the

Recommendations of General Upton had behind them the prestige of his brilliant military career. They had the advocacy and support of the great soldier who then commanded the American armies, General Sherman. They embodied the practical lessons of the Civil War and the results of military science throughout the world. Yet his voice was as the voice of one crying in the wilderness. The government did not even print his report.

Thus are nations, and especially republics, unmindful and oblivious of the advice and warnings of their most trusted and unselfish public servants. The work of such men as General Upton bear momentarily upon the future but the mass of the people and their representatives are concerned only with the present. Napoleon in commenting upon the relation of the military to the body politic said:

Without an army, force or discipline there is neither political independence nor civil liberty. When an entire people are armed and wish to defend their liberty they are invincible. The army is the nation. Only a *national* army can assure tranquillity at home and respect abroad. The force of armies is the principal support of states. If a state does not maintain an army it will certainly be conquered. A state that is too vain of being a nation and too much attached to, and confident of its independence, to feel and appreciate the necessity of an army and a fleet, is doomed to failure and disintegration.

These words of wisdom and warning from Napoleon, as the great master of statecraft and of war, are as true today as when he uttered them. They show that the national policy of "peace at any price" is enervating, dangerous and ultimately destructive. A nation cannot shirk the ever present and momentous responsibility of its existence, cannot relax its vigilance except at the price of sudden death. Further quotations from statesmen and military leaders throughout the world in support of "the necessity and wisdom of reasonable preparedness." for the exigencies of war seem unnecessary, however much they might add the weight of the "best evidence" to the successful solution

of the problem before us. Our people have seen or heard these and similar quotations for years and passed them by as the alleged vaporings of high-brow specialists, the outpourings of jingoism and the clamorings of special interests. Even the lessons of notable and portentous historical examples make little impression upon the mass of the people and their demagogues, but upon the minds of our leaders of thought and action the effect should be different. There is just as much sense and value in the cry of militarism as of pacifism and both are equally difficult of definition. If we define militarism as over-preparation against war the United States stands acquitted at once. If we define pacifism as dangerous sentimentalism against reasonable preparation for the eventuality of war the United States stands convicted at once. How are we to demonstrate to the extreme pacifist and the extreme militarist the untenableness of their views? Will the sacrifices of war or the dangers of decay bring conviction? Must the majority suffer to convince the minority? Johnson in his *Arms and the Race* (1915) says that

Whatever their dangers materialism and pacifism find man in his most developed state. However much we may admire the primitive virtues of courage and generosity, however much we may despise greed and the fear of death or even pain, we are bound to take man's advance in terms of intellect. It is by thinking and reasoning that we have advanced; and by thinking and reasoning we have reared a civilization that makes for happiness and abhors destruction and bloodshed. Our great problem is one of balance, of advancing wisely without imprudence, lest we slip back into the primitive brute, or on the other hand lose our foothold in a too eager search for happiness. . . .

There are two topics of special interest constantly brought forward in pacifist debates: disarmament (land and sea) and the international mind. The first is essentially a practical question; the second an intellectual one. We may accept as a basis of argument that it is wholly desirable that the great powers should agree to a permanent peace. On this basis what are the difficulties of the question, its probabilities and our possible means of action? It is likely that public sentiment at the close of the present war

will demand land disarmament. Are the difficulties in its way superable? One of the gravest obstacles lies in the fact that no two nations are situated in the same way. The practical difficulties grow the more we study the details. And we need not even state the further complications that the parallel question of naval disarmament introduces. With that also no two countries, no two geographical areas present the same conditions. Why not consider war as one of the necessary evils of our probationary existence on this planet, just as we consider the inevitable certainty of death, epidemics, fire, flood and storms? On that basis the modern nations have, at great cost of labor, investigation and money worked out a reasonable system of preparation and protection to minimize and resist, as far as possible, the scourge of these evils. This system may be summed up in the words: *Insurance against loss*. Billions of wealth are invested in this system and its acceptance is world-wide. Labor and money expended against "a rainy day." An investment to provide protection from loss that may never happen, but should it ever occur the much-needed protection would be instantly available, and thus save life and property from irreparable loss.

There is no reward for becoming intolerant and impractical in dealing with the usual happenings in life. War must be classed with those inevitable happenings, as inseparably associated with the imperfect nature of man. War must therefore be insured against by the maintenance of an adequate army and navy. The greater and more progressive our cities, the greater and more expensive our preparations against the occurrence of crime therein. Where is the balance between over-education, industrial agitation, religious dissension, parasitic dependence, discontent and crime? War is related to all of these, and it has been demonstrated that peace alone cannot supply the alleviation sought. No nation can survive perpetual peace and seclusion from the responsibilities attaching to membership in the family of nations. Consider the history and fate of China and Korea comprising nearly

a half billion of people. Unadulterated peace leads to slothfulness, over-feeding, dry rot, goutiness, heart failure, luxury, race suicide, vice, agitation, discontent, weakness, and many other evils which undermine and destroy nations. A military system that educates young men in obedience, endurance, respect for authority, cleanliness, frugality, order, punctuality and coöperation cannot injure a nation, but on the contrary will greatly strengthen it in the direction of progress, independence and security. In war and in preparation for war it is better to be hated than despised; better to be foremost than tailmost; better to be tolerant than slothful; better to endure than to complain; better to be discreet than precipitate; better to be chivalrous than arrogant; and in general, better to be possessed of all the Christian virtues that the nation's success may be the greater and the more lasting. As a matter of fact peace and war are the handmaids of progressive national development. Their spheres of action are not inconsistent with the healthy growth of the state. The prime object of preparation for war is to preserve peace of a rational and efficient sort, conforming to the needs of the people and insuring the sovereignty of the nation. No degree of civilization will ever change these essential relations, between the three most important conditions of the state, which may be expressed as, the absence of war, readiness to meet it, and the fact of its existence. A state must have the power to enforce the observance of its rights and inflict a penalty for non-observance. Justifiable peace is the active and reasonable preparation to meet the conditions of justifiable war. The amount of insurance to be carried by the government in making such preparation must be determined by the state. As the state grows in opulence, power and territory the insurance must be proportionately increased. Adequate preparation against war means instant readiness to engage in it when the tocsin sounds the alarm. Delay is always costly and generally fatal. One of the theories of the pacifists is that preparation against war encourages and hastens war. With equal force it could be said that preparation against disease causes infection and the spread

of epidemics but such reasoning is self-destructive. Another theory is that the nation's vitality is exhausted by war through destroying the most vigorous part of its population. But the fallacious assumptions embraced in this argument are controverted by the facts of history. In the majority of instances nations have not only recovered from the effects of war, however much prolonged, but have exhibited renewed energy and extraordinary development following its termination. The convulsions of war are required to bring about radical changes in the life of a nation. War shakes up the forces of industry, law and order, and stirs the energies of a people as no other agency can. Another theory of the pacifists against preparation for war is based on the alleged destruction of wealth and its diversion from legitimate avenues of industrial development. But here the premises are wrong as well as the conclusions. Preparation for war puts large sums of money in circulation and the raw products of the country are developed and brought into use to the utmost limit of labor and capital. All of this contributes to the prosperity of the people and enables them to recover more rapidly from the shock of war. Money is called forth from its hiding places and rapidly circulated, invigorating business, dispelling the enigma of the unemployed, and reducing the ranks of the parasitic non-producers. Johnston says:

What then is the truth of the matter? It would appear to be this, that the energy generated by war, the confidence engendered by success, and the adaptability and resourcefulness taught by military enterprise, far offsets any debit that may come from the losses.

Now, in conclusion, let us of the United States be wise and reasonable in placing our house in order against the dangers inherent in our national existence. The investment is safe and exhibits sound business judgment. In the fundamentals we are not different from other nations, nor can we claim any special dispensation from providence that will automatically shield us from evil in guiding the ship of state. The difficulties of national administration are increasing in proportion with our expansion, civiliza-

tion and opulence. Dangers that necessarily appertain to our membership in the family of nations. We have always been one of the "world powers" in spite of our imagined seclusion. The fantasy of the Monroe doctrine is now dispelled. Let us pinch ourselves and realize that we are flesh and blood, and human like other nations. We must fulfill our obligations as a duly installed member of the family of nations, or become a subject people too weak to hold the reins of an independent government and therefore subject to partition and absorption by those people who are equal to the responsibilities of a virile and progressive government. We must either advance to the dignity of a governing nation, or fall back to the subordinate position of a governed one.